Great stuff. Though entirely beside the point of the discussion I was intrigued by the 256 neurons idea in part because this signals RAM and early computing, 256 being the highest number held in one byte, or 100000000 in binary. Had to google Dr Fried (who almost certainly prefers to use the German version of his name and not pronounce it as if it were English) if only to see whether he did his work in the early years of microcomputers. At a guess he could easily monitor 256 neurons but 257 would have required twice the capacity. That is neither here nor there. More to the point, the legal argument for accountability even if free will can be shown to not exist at all could lie in the concept of regulating societal behaviour through mutual faith in a rules based system. Getting rid of the associated connotations in, say, compensation is hence attempted by using the concept 'culpa' over 'guilt'. Semantically it makes no difference at all but the drift is that those causing harm or loss can be liable for damages despite the harm being unintended. Free will or not, harm may happen as a consequence of actions where you should have known better and the societal fix is to make you liable for damages. If free will is not assumed should we then consider the results of our actions to be accidents, in which case we are not responsible for the direct or indirect consequences. Perhaps the fallacy is the absolutist binary view of freedom of choice or free will if you like. Imagine a course of action determined 80% by free will but 20% by circumstances entirely outside our control, perhaps the reflected glint in the axe in the example. Can such an example be used to demonstrate the absence or presence of a free will? If constrained by 20% is the will free or not?
Some philosophers (e.g. Ansgar Beckermann) would argue that the concept of 'free will' is alteady incoherent. According to him and others, there is no such thing as a will that is not influenced by something. Therefore, the will is never 'free'. But that does not mean that peoole aren't responsible for their actions. Beckermann would argue that a person may not be able 'to want what he wants', but he can very well 'do what he wants'.
John Locke, for example, wrote that our will might be called free if we are capable of two things. 1. To stop before initiating the action and think about the consequences, and 2. To act according to our thoughts.
I think that those ideas are more coherent than the common concept of 'free will', and I would furthermore argue that they are compatible with determinism.
Thank you very much for taking the time to leave a comment! I really appreciate it. You are quite right, of course, that some consider the concept of free will to be incoherent. Many psychologists would agree, I suspect. Perhaps that is precisely why it is such a difficult topic to investigate: maybe it's like searching for the east pole. Wasn't it Kant who said that freewill was one of the three things that the human mind was incapable of understanding? Not even that is going to stop this newsletter, though.
Thank you very much for your fascinating comments! It was kind of you to take the time to respond. I can confirm that Fried goes by 'freed', as opposed to 'fried' as in eggs. Further than that I cannot go, since very little in this area can be either confirmed or denied. You make a really good point, though, about the 256 neurons. A number with resonance! It's a coincidence if that number doesn't mean something more, isn't it? One wonders whether the 257th might have been the charm - 'Ah! The problem is solved!' You are absolutely right to make the distinction (which I did not make in the newsletter) between responsibility and accountability. I wish that were a chimera. It's a concern that western legal systems have these built in assumptions that we only hold people accountable for what we think they are responsible for. That's the ideal, anyway. It is clear that, in practice, that is not the case. One can't help feeling, though, that justice has not quite been served if, say, a person suffering badly from some diagnosable psychiatric ailment is nevertheless held responsible for the crimes committed after diagnosis. Perhaps free will is a matter of degree, as you suggest at the end there, yes. If so, one wonders what a calculus of free will would look like. At what point - 30%? 90% - would a court decide not to convict? What are your thoughts?
Wonderful article and provocative discussion of this important issue. I have been reading, Determined, by Robert Sapolsky which does a really darn good job of arguing there is no free will, not even limited free will. Even if there was some free will there are also interesting questions worth pondering.
In Are Criminals Real we suggest that even though criminal means a person who commits a crime that there may be a difference between these two terms. The former may reduce, stereotype, and ultimately limit our understanding of why people commit these acts.
Ultimately we also think that we need to be careful with the word crime as what constitutes a crime or not a crime is also often, if not always, socially constructed.
It's terribly difficult to make the argument that we have free will. Certainly it's easier to argue the other way. All the evidence seems to be on that side. Perhaps the only compelling reason we have to believe in free will is the illusion that we all share - that we do indeed have it. It may only be an illusion, but it's a tremendously compelling one! That in itself seems as though it ought to mean something. Perhaps the illusions is just some kind of survival mechanism, though.
This is why Kant said that free will is a topic too difficult for mere human beings...
Great stuff. Though entirely beside the point of the discussion I was intrigued by the 256 neurons idea in part because this signals RAM and early computing, 256 being the highest number held in one byte, or 100000000 in binary. Had to google Dr Fried (who almost certainly prefers to use the German version of his name and not pronounce it as if it were English) if only to see whether he did his work in the early years of microcomputers. At a guess he could easily monitor 256 neurons but 257 would have required twice the capacity. That is neither here nor there. More to the point, the legal argument for accountability even if free will can be shown to not exist at all could lie in the concept of regulating societal behaviour through mutual faith in a rules based system. Getting rid of the associated connotations in, say, compensation is hence attempted by using the concept 'culpa' over 'guilt'. Semantically it makes no difference at all but the drift is that those causing harm or loss can be liable for damages despite the harm being unintended. Free will or not, harm may happen as a consequence of actions where you should have known better and the societal fix is to make you liable for damages. If free will is not assumed should we then consider the results of our actions to be accidents, in which case we are not responsible for the direct or indirect consequences. Perhaps the fallacy is the absolutist binary view of freedom of choice or free will if you like. Imagine a course of action determined 80% by free will but 20% by circumstances entirely outside our control, perhaps the reflected glint in the axe in the example. Can such an example be used to demonstrate the absence or presence of a free will? If constrained by 20% is the will free or not?
Some philosophers (e.g. Ansgar Beckermann) would argue that the concept of 'free will' is alteady incoherent. According to him and others, there is no such thing as a will that is not influenced by something. Therefore, the will is never 'free'. But that does not mean that peoole aren't responsible for their actions. Beckermann would argue that a person may not be able 'to want what he wants', but he can very well 'do what he wants'.
John Locke, for example, wrote that our will might be called free if we are capable of two things. 1. To stop before initiating the action and think about the consequences, and 2. To act according to our thoughts.
I think that those ideas are more coherent than the common concept of 'free will', and I would furthermore argue that they are compatible with determinism.
Thank you very much for taking the time to leave a comment! I really appreciate it. You are quite right, of course, that some consider the concept of free will to be incoherent. Many psychologists would agree, I suspect. Perhaps that is precisely why it is such a difficult topic to investigate: maybe it's like searching for the east pole. Wasn't it Kant who said that freewill was one of the three things that the human mind was incapable of understanding? Not even that is going to stop this newsletter, though.
That reminds me of Christopher Hitchens who once said something like: "Of course, we have free will. We have no choice but to have it." :)
I hadn't heard that quote before, but I like it!
Thank you very much for your fascinating comments! It was kind of you to take the time to respond. I can confirm that Fried goes by 'freed', as opposed to 'fried' as in eggs. Further than that I cannot go, since very little in this area can be either confirmed or denied. You make a really good point, though, about the 256 neurons. A number with resonance! It's a coincidence if that number doesn't mean something more, isn't it? One wonders whether the 257th might have been the charm - 'Ah! The problem is solved!' You are absolutely right to make the distinction (which I did not make in the newsletter) between responsibility and accountability. I wish that were a chimera. It's a concern that western legal systems have these built in assumptions that we only hold people accountable for what we think they are responsible for. That's the ideal, anyway. It is clear that, in practice, that is not the case. One can't help feeling, though, that justice has not quite been served if, say, a person suffering badly from some diagnosable psychiatric ailment is nevertheless held responsible for the crimes committed after diagnosis. Perhaps free will is a matter of degree, as you suggest at the end there, yes. If so, one wonders what a calculus of free will would look like. At what point - 30%? 90% - would a court decide not to convict? What are your thoughts?
Wonderful article and provocative discussion of this important issue. I have been reading, Determined, by Robert Sapolsky which does a really darn good job of arguing there is no free will, not even limited free will. Even if there was some free will there are also interesting questions worth pondering.
In Are Criminals Real we suggest that even though criminal means a person who commits a crime that there may be a difference between these two terms. The former may reduce, stereotype, and ultimately limit our understanding of why people commit these acts.
Ultimately we also think that we need to be careful with the word crime as what constitutes a crime or not a crime is also often, if not always, socially constructed.
https://curingcrime.substack.com/p/are-criminals-real-d04b7e1f63d2?r=2bk4r1
It's terribly difficult to make the argument that we have free will. Certainly it's easier to argue the other way. All the evidence seems to be on that side. Perhaps the only compelling reason we have to believe in free will is the illusion that we all share - that we do indeed have it. It may only be an illusion, but it's a tremendously compelling one! That in itself seems as though it ought to mean something. Perhaps the illusions is just some kind of survival mechanism, though.
This is why Kant said that free will is a topic too difficult for mere human beings...